The British Empire and the War Effort: A Comparative Study of the Experiences of the British Honduran Forestry Unit and the Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit

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### Abbreviations

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<td>British Honduran Forestry Unit</td>
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Abstract

This dissertation examines the experiences of the British Honduran Forestry Unit and the Newfoundland Overseas Forestry unit during their time in Scotland during World War Two. Furthermore, it assesses and contextualises the racially prejudiced attitudes present in the official government records concerning the British Honduran Forestry Unit. Using official government records and secondary sources it finds that race played a definitive role in certain aspects of both units’ experiences in Scotland, and that the racist attitudes visible in the official government records were reflective of the attitudes of British society more broadly.
Introduction

During World War Two (WWII) thousands of men from across the British Empire came to Britain to fell timber to help Britain meet its home-grown timber demands. Prior to the war Britain had imported ninety percent of the timber it used from numerous countries across the globe including Canada, France, Finland and Russia. However, wartime conditions not only caused Britain’s demand for timber to soar, especially for making coal-mine pit props, but also cut off its access to global timber supplies. Therefore at the request of the Forestry Commission the British government embarked on a recruitment drive to employ foresters from across the Empire. Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, Newfoundlanders and British Hondurans answered the motherland’s call and contributed to the war effort. While the Canadian, Australian and New Zealand units were all military forestry units, the Newfoundlander and the British Honduran units were composed of civilians and thus had very different experiences. Women, school children, conscientious objectors, Irish workers and Italian prisoners of war further expanded the wartime forestry workforce. All told the number of foresters in wartime Britain peaked at 73,000 in 1943.

Contingents of the Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit (NOFU) began to arrive in Britain in 1939. On the 19th November 1939 the government of Newfoundland passed the Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit Act and on the 18th December 1939 the first contingent of Newfoundland foresters disembarked in Liverpool. A further five contingents arrived in Britain over the years that followed. The initial call was for two-thousand foresters

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4 Newfoundland Overseas Foresters’ Association, Timber!!! (Glasgow: 1945), p. 11.
from Newfoundland. However, between 1939 and 1945, in total 3400 Newfoundlanders came to Britain to fell timber. The men were dispersed amongst seventy-one camps, sixty-nine of which were in Scotland, where the majority of men served.

The British Honduran Forestry Unit (BHFU) arrived in Scotland two years after the NOFU. The first contingent arrived in September 1941, and a second contingent arrived in November 1942. The first contingent was dispersed across three camps in Southern Scotland; Traprain Law in East Lothian, Duns in the Scottish Borders, and Kirkpatrick Fleming in Dumfries and Galloway. The second contingent was dispersed among three camps in Northern Scotland; Golspie in Sutherland, and Kinlochewe and Achnashellach in Wester Ross. British Honduras was one of the later countries to answer Britain’s call for forestry workers. The economy of British Honduras was for the most part a ‘single product economy’, dominated by mahogany exports, a situation which left the colony in an economically vulnerable position. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, global demand for mahogany drastically decreased, which caused mass unemployment of up to forty percent. Unsurprisingly then, in May 1941 when the British Government asked the Governor of British Honduras to supply 500 foresters for immediate work in Scotland, the Governor gladly obliged. In 1942 a further 500 men were requested by the government, however, due to increasing job opportunities in neighbouring Panama just over 300 men arrived in Scotland from British Honduras in November 1942. One of the objectives of

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5 Ibid, p. 11.
this dissertation is to contrast and compare the experiences of the men from Newfoundland and British Honduras in wartime Britain.

The lived experiences of ethnic minorities in England is a well-established field attracting an increasing number of historians. However, in Scotland this is not the case. Much of the historiography of ethnic minorities in Scotland takes the form of snippets provided in texts dealing with ethnic minorities in Britain more generally. Therefore, the historiography which deals with ethnic minorities solely or largely in Scotland is brief and is confined to a few topics. First, there is a small but growing historiography on slaves, freed slaves and the mixed-race children of plantation owners in Scotland during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Second, Lascar seamen in major ports during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have received some attention from historians. And third, a few studies of the race riots which many Lascar seamen participated in and which occurred in tandem with the Red Clydeside riots which occurred in the aftermath of World War One (WWI) have been produced. These exceptions aside, the historical experiences of ethnic minorities in Scotland is a particularly neglected area of study. This is partially due to a lack of interest in

the subject, but it can also be attributed to the lack of sources due to the relatively small presence of ethnic minorities in Scotland until the later twentieth century.

Furthermore, the role which colonials from throughout the British Empire played during WWII is a subject which had been largely ignored until the late 1980s. Prior to the late 1980s the contributions of colonials during WWII were sometimes briefly mentioned, but no real effort was made to understand their experiences.\(^{15}\) Despite a shift since the 1980s, the focus of more recent work has nevertheless mostly been on those who fought in Colonial armies during WWII. As a result, the efforts of colonials who came to Britain to participate in war work remains substantially underexplored.\(^{16}\)

The war work carried out by the BHFU is one of these underexplored topics. Only two individuals have dealt with it in any real depth.\(^{17}\) *Telling the Truth: The Life and Times of the British Honduran Forestry Unit in Scotland 1941-43* (1985) written by Amos A. Ford, a British Honduran Forestry worker who served in the unit, is a semi-historical account of the BHFU’s time in Scotland. Ford draws chiefly upon the welfare records held at the National Archives (Kew, London), and his own experiences and interviews with ex-foresters to illustrate his core argument that the appalling experiences of many of the BHFU workers was largely due to racism on the part of different government ministries and individuals.\(^{18}\)

Meanwhile, historian Marika Sherwood’s contributions include a short monograph and two essays, written between 1982 and 1985, which similarly draw upon interviews and the


\(^{18}\) Ford, *Telling the Truth*, pp. i-87.
aforementioned welfare records. In common with Ford, Sherwood concludes that the appalling treatment of the BHFU was largely due to the race of the men who served in the unit.\(^{19}\) Ford and Sherwood’s works share many similarities and cover most of the same aspects of the men’s experiences including their recruitment, arrival in Scotland, work, health, camp conditions and subsequent repatriation.\(^{20}\) Another useful source are the interviews carried out with BHFU forester Sam Martinez. In these Martinez reminisces on his time working in the BHFU camps favourably. Martinez’s testimony thus conflicts with some of what has been written by Ford and Sherwood.\(^{21}\)

In common with the lack of historiography of the role which ethnic minorities played during WWII the role which the NOFU played has also been neglected. There are few detailed monographs or articles which examine the experiences of the NOFU. *Timber!!!* published in 1946 is a short book published by the Newfoundland Overseas Foresters’ Association which was not intended to be a historical book but a souvenir for the foresters to remember their work together.\(^{22}\) Nevertheless, this short work provides an insightful overview of the Newfoundland foresters’ time in Scotland including an informative analysis of the units’ operations in Britain.\(^{23}\) The second monograph, *They Also Served: The Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit, 1939-1946*, was written by a NOFU forester in 1987 and it discusses

\(^{19}\)Sherwood, *Many Struggles*; Sherwood, *The British Honduran*; Sherwood, ‘It is not’.


\(^{22}\)Newfoundland Overseas Foresters’ Association, *Timber!!!*, p. 3.

\(^{23}\)Ibid, pp. 1-80.
the units’ operations in much greater depth.24 A further two articles have been written about the NOFU, but these are by archaeologists and thus in their writing about the historical background of the NOFU they rely heavily on the two aforementioned books.25 With the exception of the works mentioned above the contributions and experiences of the NOFU have been relegated to snippets in books dealing with Newfoundland and Canadian history more widely.26

The primary focus of this dissertation are the experiences of the BHFU and the NOFU during their time in Scotland. The living conditions which these two units’ experienced have been subject to much controversy, especially in the case of the BHFU.27 Therefore certain aspects of the NOFU’s and the BHFU’s time in Scotland shall be contrasted and compared in order to more fully explore the prevailing historiographic viewpoint that race was the overarching factor in the sometimes appalling treatment of the BHFU.28 The Ministry of Supply (MoS) was responsible for the welfare of both units. And a closer inspection of the official records of both the BHFU and the NOFU suggests that although race did play an important role in the attitude of the MoS towards the British Honduran men it did not fully explain the MoS’s apathy towards the men’s welfare. This is due to the fact that this apathy appears to have been shown towards the NOFU also.29 To further explore this in greater depth and to ascertain whether race did indeed play a central role in the treatment and experiences of the NOFU and the BHFU other aspects of both units’ time in Scotland shall be comparatively

24 T. Curran, They Also Served: The Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit, 1939-1946 (St John’s, 1987). Unfortunately I was never able to use this book as the only copy I located in Britain had gone missing from the library.
28 Ford, Telling the Truth, pp. i-87; Sherwood, ‘It is not’, pp. 116-141.
analysed including their terms of employment, work camps, reception by the local population and eventual disbandment.

Much of what is written in regard to the British Honduran men is shocking to a reader in the politically correct twenty-first century. However, when exploring the contemporary attitudes of individuals and government ministries toward race it must be acknowledged that these individuals were largely the products of their time and society. Therefore the second, and much briefer, chapter of this dissertation will aim to contextualise the racism present in the official BHFU records in regard to the prevailing attitudes on race in 1940s Britain. For example a significant number of pages in the BHFU’s welfare reports are dedicated to the concerns of government ministries regarding relations between the men and white women and this chapter shall endeavour to contextualise and interrogate such concerns. Hence the objective of this chapter is to contextualise and evaluate the racist attitudes in the records to assess whether these attitudes were representative of attitudes in British society more widely.

The dissertation draws upon numerous primary and secondary sources. The main primary sources are the extensive official records on the NOFU and the BHFU produced by the Colonial Office (CO) and the Ministry of Aviation (MoA) which are held at the National Archives (Kew, London). The CO and MoA reports cover most aspects of the BHFU’s time in Scotland. They primarily consist of welfare reports and the correspondence sent between the CO and the MoS and other government departments and officials including Members of Parliament and Members of the House of Lords. These letters discuss the findings of the welfare reports as well as discussing issues such as the BHFU’s arrival, grievances, management, local relations and repatriation. In total these five reports

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30 The Ministry of Supply, which was responsible for the coordination of Army resources during World War II, was absorbed into the Ministry of Aviation in 1959. Hence the Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit are held in the latter ministries files. Records created or inherited by the Ministry of Supply and successors, the Ordnance Board, and related bodies - http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C251 (accessed 15/03/15).
concerning the BHFU are close to eight-hundred pages in length.\textsuperscript{31} Although, unfortunately many of the records have been ‘destroyed under statute’.\textsuperscript{32} The MoA’s report on NOFU deals with similar issues to the CO reports, but as a single report it is far briefer at less than two-hundred-and-fifty pages.\textsuperscript{33} This record similarly contains welfare reports on the NOFU as well as a great deal of correspondence between the Dominion Office (DO) and the MoS and other relevant government bodies and individuals. These official records have also been supplemented by other primary sources and by secondary books and articles. Nevertheless, these substantial, detailed and wide ranging government records provide the basis for much of this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{31} TNA: CO/123/384/7, Forestry Unit, 1943; TNA:CO 876/41, British Honduras Forestry Unit: health and welfare, January- December 1942; TNA: CO 876/42, British Honduras Forestry Units: health and welfare, December 1942 – September 1943; TNA: CO 876/43, British Honduras Forestry Unit: health and welfare, December 1942 – December 1943; TNA: AVIA 22/1239, British Honduras Forestry Unit and Newfoundland Forestry Unit timber camps in Scotland: investigation into welfare conditions, 1942-1943.

\textsuperscript{32} See TNA: CO 876/41; TNA: CO 876/42; TNA: CO 876/43.

\textsuperscript{33} TNA: AVIA 22/1352, Newfoundland Forestry Unit in Scotland: welfare arrangements, 1942-1944.
Chapter 1 – A Comparative Case Study of the British Honduran Forestry Unit and the Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit

The aim of this chapter is to contrast and compare many different aspects of the BHFU’s and the NOFU’s experiences in Scotland to assess whether or not race played a defining role in the treatment and experiences of either unit. To accomplish this four different aspects of both units’ experiences in Scotland shall be comparatively analysed: their terms of employment; the conditions inside their work camps; their reception by the local populations; and their eventual disbandment. Both units were employed by the MoS during their time in Britain, and this Ministry was therefore responsible for all aspects of the foresters’ lives in Britain including their employment, work camps and welfare. 34

Unfortunately, despite ongoing criticism from the DO and the CO, which both expressed concerns over the welfare conditions of the NOFU and the BHFU respectively, the MoS remained in charge of the welfare of both units.35

Terms of Employment

The NOFU and the BHFU were brought to Britain to carry out the same job, essentially felling timber, however, a comparative analysis of their terms of employment indicate that the two units were employed under divergent terms and conditions.

The Newfoundlanders’ Terms of Employment

The NOFU were employed by the MoS on the basis of six-month contracts after which time they could claim repatriation or re-engage for a further six months. They worked a forty-
eight hour week for a wage of twelve dollars per week, or forty-eight shillings, with additional benefits of free board, lodging, bedding, tools, medical services and return travel.\textsuperscript{36} Half pay was also paid for days lost due to sickness and those injured whilst working were entitled to compensation under the Employers Liability and Workman’s Compensation Act. Those men injured along with those suffering from long term illnesses were repatriated at the British Government’s expense. However, those who were deemed in breach of contract were discharged and repatriated at their own expense. Although, the contracts did not stipulate whether or not the men would be allowed to remain in Britain after their employment had ended. According to a recruiting advertisement in a Newfoundland newspaper the men from the unit were also allowed to seek enlistment in the armed forces providing they gave reasonable notice.\textsuperscript{37} Nevertheless, the contracts which the NOFU signed in fact prohibited them from joining the armed forces.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{The British Hondurans’ Terms of Employment}

The BHFU’s contracts stipulated that the men would work in Scotland for three years or for the duration of the war, whichever was less. The men were paid sixty shillings, for a forty-eight hour working week.\textsuperscript{39} Similarly to the NOFU, the British Hondurans were entitled to free transport to and from Britain, alongside ‘…free board, lodging, bedding, tools, medical services and clothing consisting of great coat, serge working suit and boots.’\textsuperscript{40} In cases of


\textsuperscript{38} Newfoundland Forestry Unit Form of Engagement – available at \url{http://www.mgl.ca/~cpike/formofengagement.html} (accessed 23/02/15).

\textsuperscript{39} Sherwood, \textit{The British Honduran}, pp. 7-8.

\textsuperscript{40} TNA: CO 876/43, (unnumbered), Copy of a BHFU Contract, (undated).
sickness and injury, the terms in the BHFU’s contracts were identical to those in the NOFU’s contracts. However, BHFU men who were deemed in breach of contract were repatriated at the British Government’s expense and nor were they allowed to remain in Britain after the termination of their contract. Furthermore, the BHFU foresters’ contracts stipulated that under no terms would the men be allowed to seek employment in the armed forces, nor were they allowed to seek other forms of employment in Britain. A source of contention for the British Honduran men was the fact that their contracts did not stipulate that their ‘free’ board and lodging would actually be deducted from their wages. As a result twenty-five shillings was deducted each week from their sixty shilling pay packet, leaving the men with thirty-five shillings a week in actual income, thirteen shillings less than their ‘Newfie’ counterparts.

Conclusions

Analysis of the terms and conditions under which the foresters were hired reveals that Newfoundlanders and British Hondurans were treated differently from the outset. The most glaring difference was the length of their contracts. While the archival sources reveal no explanation for this discrepancy. One possibility is that it can be attributed to the greater ease and frequency by which ships could travel to and from Canada and Great Britain in 1939 and 1940. In contrast to the difficulties faced in sailing from the West Indies to Great Britain from 1941 onwards due to the ongoing Battle of the Atlantic. Six NOFU contingents made it safely across the Atlantic between 1939 and 1941. In comparison the first BHFU contingent, which arrived in 1941, experienced some difficulties. The first two ships the S.S Orbita and the S.S Strathaird reached Britain safely. However, the final ship

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41 Ibid.
42 TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 16, ‘The British Honduras Forestry Unit’, Note by a Committee, (undated) 1942.
44 Newfoundland Overseas Foresters’ Association, Timber!!!, p. 11.
the S.S Svend Foyn was torpedoed on its voyage to Britain. Fortunately all on board survived, but this demonstrates the logistical problems encountered in shipping the units across the Atlantic during the War.\textsuperscript{45} Nevertheless, the length of the contracts signed by the BHFU prompted Sherwood to describe their work as ‘…effectively indentured labour.’\textsuperscript{46} In common with the contracts, no explanation was given in the sources for the differences in wages paid to the men. After the BHFU had had their food and board, which was literally free for the Newfoundlanders, deducted from their pay they were fifty-two shillings worse off each month than the Newfoundland foresters.\textsuperscript{47} Considering that both units were brought to Britain to carry out the same work, it seems likely that these pay differentials were based solely or largely on the grounds of race. The excessive length of the contract given to the BHFU could also be ascribed to their race, but it would be naïve to ignore the logistical realities of shipping men across the Atlantic during WWII. Nonetheless, the terms which the BHFU were contracted under could be described as indentured labour as Sherwood argued.

\textbf{The Camps}

Although the units arrived at different times and from different continents both had somewhat similar experiences in the camps which would become their homes for the duration of their stay in Scotland. Both were housed in hastily built camps consisting of numerous timber huts, and in the case of both units the camps were not ready for them upon their arrival. The structure and organisation of the NOFU camps nevertheless differed from those of the BHFU. Firstly, the NOFU foresters were contracted on a six monthly basis which meant that during their time in Scotland their numbers ebbed and flowed.\textsuperscript{48} And

\textsuperscript{45}Sherwood, \textit{The British Honduran}, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{46}Ibid, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{47}Newfoundland Overseas Foresters’ Association, \textit{Timber!!!}, p. 13; TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 16, ‘The British Honduras Forestry Unit’, Note by a Committee, (undated) 1942.
\textsuperscript{48}Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit - \texttt{http://www.secretscotland.org.uk/index.php/Secrets/NewfoundlandOverseasForestryUnit} (accessed
secondly, unlike the BHFU camps, the NOFU camps were not permanent. After a forest had been cleared, the camp was closed and a new camp was built at the next forestry site.\textsuperscript{49} Thus the numbers of workers in the unit, as well as the number of camps was constantly in flux. For example in May 1942 an official at the MoS reported of the NOFU that ‘The present strength of this unit is 1, 660. The men are accommodated in 31 camps in various parts of Scotland… each contain 40 to 70 men, according to the size of the operation.’\textsuperscript{50} This was in stark contrast to BHFU camps of which there were six. Furthermore due to the three year contracts under which the BHFU were employed, there was little fluctuation in the size of the unit.\textsuperscript{51} The only exception to this was the repatriation of close to 100 men at the end on 1942 which was attributed to a multitude of reasons by the MoS such as ill health, discontentment, and misbehaviour.\textsuperscript{52} In May 1942, before the arrival of the second BHFU contingent, there were three BHFU camps in operation and an estimated 170 men in each camp.\textsuperscript{53} From the outset the NOFU and the BHFU had different experiences during their time in Scotland, not least due to the more transient nature of NOFU camp life and the rather permanent nature of BHFU camp life.

Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit Camps

The first contingents of Newfoundland foresters arrived at Liverpool in less than a month after the British Government had reached out to the Newfoundland government for assistance. Due to this swift arrival camps had not yet been built for the NOFU foresters and few provisions such as the necessary tools were in place. This resulted in the men being

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Sherwood, \textit{The British Honduras}, pp. 7-14.
\textsuperscript{52} TNA: CO 876/42, Record No. 79, List of Repatriated Men, 9 August 1943.
temporarily housed in ‘… hotels, school-houses, village halls, drill sheds, barns, tents or any place where accommodation could be arranged while they built their own camps.’\(^{54}\) These camps were built out of timber which the men felled themselves, and a typical NOFU camp ‘…would consist of bunkhouses, a wash house, a cook house, a dining hall, a recreation hut/ canteen and the ‘fore peak’ where the camp foreman and his clerk and tallymen would work.’\(^{55}\) From the outset these hastily-built camps had problems with regards to issues such as structure, comfort and recreation facilities. Unfortunately, the MoS’s report on the NOFU does not go into great depth or detail about the conditions in the camps and many of the welfare reports discussed within letters in the report are missing.\(^ {56}\) The welfare reports, many of which were produced by the DO, almost certainly harshly criticised the MoS, so it is perhaps unsurprising that they have been omitted. Nonetheless, from the few examples given and the descriptions in various letters it is apparent that the conditions in some of the NOFU camps were unsatisfactory. For example in 1942 a Dominion Office official remarked that the camps were ‘…little more than prisoners’ compounds’ with the foresters ‘…in an almost mutinous condition.’\(^ {57}\) Similarly, J. L Keith, a CO welfare officer dealing with the BHFU, stated that ‘… the Newfoundland Foresters’ welfare has been neglected…’ and that in the case of one camp the foresters ‘…should be removed from there as soon as possible, as the place was hardly fit for human inhabitation in winter time.’\(^ {58}\) Despite the lack of surviving detailed reports in the official records it seems clear that the official consensus was that the NOFU camps were unsatisfactory.

Conditions do not appear to have improved with time either. Even although the first NOFU foresters arrived in Scotland in 1939, as late as 1942 the welfare conditions of the camps


\(^{56}\) See TNA: AVIA 22/1352.


\(^{58}\) TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 60, Letter from J. L. Keith to Mr Parkin, 29 April 1942.
they were living in ‘… left much to be desired…’ according to a letter written by a DO official. A point reiterated again in a letter later written by Clement Atlee, then deputy Prime Minister. The problems with the camps were many and often avoidable. Firstly, many of the camps were built hurriedly and were thus often badly situated and exposed to the elements. Secondly, sanitation was an issue as many of the washhouses were not fully functional as the plumbing had not been completed, nor was there a means of disposing of waste. In some camps the conditions were so unsanitary that the Department of Health received complaints. An earlier report found complaints of leaking roofs in one camp, while many camps lacked recreation huts. The remoteness of many camps exacerbated this situation, with some camps being over fifteen miles from the nearest town. This undoubtedly worsened the monotony of camp life for the foresters. Yet despite these failings the MoS often blamed the foresters for not taking enough action to improve issues within their own control. Yet, one of the foresters’ primary complaints was the lack of equipment provided by the MoS which would have enabled them to carry out their duties. Clearly, the MoS were reluctant to accept responsibility for their failings in regard to the unacceptable welfare standards in the NOFU work camps.

British Honduran Forestry Unit Camps

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59 TNA: AVIA 22/1352, Record No. 2, Letter from DO official (name illegible) to Andrew Duncan MP, 6 March 1942.
60 TNA: AVIA 22/1352, Record No. 38, Letter from Clement Atlee to Andrew Duncan MP, 28 May 1942.
62 TNA: AVIA 22/1352, Record No. 56, ‘Newfoundland Forestry Unit’, Letter from Minister, Ministry of Supply to Secretary of State, Dominions Office, 25 June 1942.
63 TNA: AVIA 22/1352, Record No. 1, Newfoundland Forestry Unit. Mr Geoffrey Shakespeare’s Visit, 26 February 1942.
65 Ibid.
There were many similarities between the BHFU experiences and those of the NOFU. Although the BHFU did not have to build the camps themselves, the camps were not prepared for their arrival. And this time the MoS did not have the excuse of the foresters’ swift arrival, as they did in the case of the NOFU, because the arrival of the BHFU had been planned for a full three months before the arrival of the first contingent in September 1941.66 Furthermore, in common with the NOFU camp, there were numerous problems with the construction of the camps with the result that complaints from the foresters were rife. Consequently the CO reports concerning the BHFU camps heavily criticise the MoS’s ineptitude and apathy.67

In common with the NOFU camps, the conditions in the BHFU camps were also often vilified. A welfare officer from the Ministry of Labour and National Service described the NOFU and BHFU camps as ‘…a public scandal.’68 However, by contrast a joint committee report on the BHFU written by the MoS and the CO in 1942 describes the BHFU’s camps ‘… as well-constructed wooden hutments, providing sleeping rooms each containing 12 men, dining rooms, kitchens, ablution huts, drying rooms, latrines and … a large recreation room, to which there is a small room for a canteen attached.’69 The report continues that there is adequate food, heating, bedding and equipment and that everything within the camps is of a ‘high standard’. However, at a later point in the report it states that no electric lighting is in place. This was a basic necessity which may have led to discontent amongst the men as the NOFU camps had electric lighting. The report also states that even though recreational huts were in place, unlike some of the NOFU camps, the MoS had not outfitted them with

67 See TNA: CO 876/41; TNA: CO 876/42; CO 876/43.
68 TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 61, Note on Visit to Camps Written by J. L. Keith, 7 May 1942.
69 TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 16, ‘The British Honduras Forestry Unit’, Note by a Committee, (undated) 1942.
any recreational items and thus they were deemed as ‘insufficient’. They report comments at length on the incompetency of the medical orderlies, welfare officers and the camp managers, and lays the blame for the shortcomings mentioned above with the Officer in Charge of the unit, not with the MoS. This was despite the fact that the MoS employed all of these individuals.

However, a later report written by Dr Patterson, the Medical Officer of the unit, contradicts these findings which remarked that everything was of a ‘high standard’. In common with the NOFU camps, this report states that the ablution huts were not fully functional and the men were using bucket latrines, emptying the contents into pits, and were also burying their kitchen waste. Furthermore, in some camps the water supply was contaminated and consequently water had to be brought into the camps from local towns. Therefore, it appears that the joint report written by the CO and the MoS had understated the issues in the camps. This can perhaps be attributed to manipulation at the hands of the MoS, which wanted to avoid public criticism. Furthermore, the MoS did not keep it secret that they did not appreciate the interference of CO welfare officers. According to a CO official, Mr Fitzgerald and Sir Samuel Strang, the chairman and the deputy director of the MoS respectively, were ‘…rather concerned at what they call the frequent visits of the Welfare Department to the Unit, as the Ministry are apparently anxious to have this under their entire control with say a periodical visit from the Colonial Office.’

The most scathing report of all regarding the BHFU camps came from Rudolph Dunbar, a prominent clarinettist and journalist, who was researching the social welfare of ethnic

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70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 1, Report on Health, Welfare, etc. Of British Honduras Unit, (undated) 1942.
73 TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 55, Letter from P. Rogers to unknown, 22 April 1942.
minorities in Britain more widely. In his damning report Dunbar made many derisive claims. First, Dunbar claimed that many aspects of the camps were entirely inadequate, especially the heating and the lighting. Second, he argued that many of the huts were poorly insulated and that oftentimes there was not enough food for the men due to a lack of systematic planning. Third, Dunbar’s report claimed that the men had received inadequate clothing and that the sanitary situation in the camps were unacceptable. Dunbar highlights the incomplete condition of the ablution huts which he notes had no wash basins, and he notes that the insanitary conditions had been exacerbated because the men did not even have brooms to sweep out the huts. Finally, allegations of overwork were also made, with claims that some of the men at the Duns camp were forced to work thirteen to fourteen hour days.75

In summary Dunbar writes that

… the men are living in a deplorable condition… They are deprived of all form of entertainment and, the harsh treatment of most of them by the authorities does nothing to alleviate their sufferings… a great portion of the men are miserable and desperate… and wish to return home. The men are not provided with sufficient warm clothing and… There seems to be a muddle under the terms which the men were engaged. Married men find their wages insufficient. The men seem to have been enlisted in a haphazard fashion….76

Dunbar’s findings regarding conditions in the camps were mostly refuted by the CO. According to Keith,

76 Ibid.
Dunbar’s account of the British Honduras foresters is more sensational than correct… I have visited these camps several times and I am satisfied that the men are house under reasonably good conditions… and it is untrue to say that there are no proper sanitary arrangements… Naturally the men have grouses and there are deficiencies in their welfare arrangements, but the Ministry… are well aware of these and are doing their best.77

Keith did concede that some of the accusations were true, notably that the men’s diet had been insufficient but claimed that this had since been remedied.78 Nevertheless, the CO’s refutation of the allegations regarding the sanitary conditions in camps is questionable due to the fact that Dr Patterson’s aforementioned report had highlighted similar issues with sanitation.79 In common with the NOFU camps, it is evident that the construction of the camps and the welfare standards within the camps were unsatisfactory. Yet, the MoS again chose to place the blame with the Officers in charge and the camp workers instead of admitting and addressing its own failings in regard to the living conditions in the camps.80

Conclusions

In their works both Sherwood and Ford argue that the poor conditions experienced by the BHFU in their work camps were meted out to them due to discriminatory attitudes held by the MoS.81 Yet, considering the meagre camp and welfare conditions described in both the Newfoundlanders’ and the British Hondurans’ camps it seems likely that the reason for these poor conditions were in fact not wholly, or even largely, rooted in racist attitudes. It is clear...

77 TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 25, Letter from J. L. Keith to Sir Donald Cameron, February 1942.
78 Ibid.
80 TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 16, ‘The British Honduras Forestry Unit’, Note by a Committee, (undated) 1942.
that the incompetence and indifference exhibited by the MoS affected both forestry units regardless of race. Furthermore, the MoS was unwilling to be held accountable for its failings and instead chose, in the case of both units, to pass the blame on to those working in the camps. An example that supports this argument that both units were badly treated regardless of race comes in the form of a CO official who suspected that the MoS’s apathy towards the BHFU was due to their race. He therefore decided to contact the DO, which was responsible for the NOFU, to find out if they had ‘… had to make constant efforts to prod the M/Supply into making proper management arrangements.’ Interestingly he was told that they had, with the DO replying that they ‘… feel the Ministry of Supply had done very little to [unintelligible] the welfare arrangements of the men...’ Palpably, the MoS’s lethargy was colour blind.

**Reception by the Local Population**

The two units were received by two very different receptions from the local population. Although very little is written about the reception the NOFU received from the local population much of what is written is comparatively negative. On the other hand, the majority of what has been written about the BHFU’s reception by the local population is largely positive. On the surface it appears that the NOFU foresters’ were poorly received by the local populations because they were white men who were deemed to be ‘dodging’

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84 TNA: CO 876/42, Record No. 87, Letter from Unknown to J. L. Keith, 25 August 1943.
85 TNA: AVIA 22/1352, (unnumbered), Letter from P. E. Evans to C. U. Peat, 14 October 1942; TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 119, Letter from J. L. Keith to Mr Wyndham, 25 August 1942.
military service.\textsuperscript{87} Whereas the BHFU may have been well received due to the fact that they were somewhat of a novelty. Additionally, due to their race the same prejudices regarding ‘dodging service’ would perhaps have not applied to the BHFU. This was due to the colour bar, which prior to 1939 only allowed those of ‘pure European descent’ to enter the army.\textsuperscript{88} Even after this bar had been lifted there were very few opportunities for non-whites in the British Army.\textsuperscript{89} Furthermore, it was stipulated in the British Honduran foresters’ contracts that they were barred from seeking employment in the army.\textsuperscript{90} Therefore, the BHFU did not suffer from the same stigma over the issue of perceived non-service as the NOFU.

The Newfoundlanders’ Reception

The Newfoundland foresters’ were not received particularly well by the local Scottish population. Evidence of this can be found not only in government files on the foresters, but also in newspaper articles. The most glaring example of this is the aforementioned stigma, which was attached to the foresters’ for not serving in the armed forces. One letter from the DO, which addresses the Newfoundlanders’ want of official uniforms, highlights this animosity, stating “‘…that the men suffer a considerable amount of embarrassment from being treated as ‘undesirable civilians’.”\textsuperscript{91} Another letter notes that the Newfoundlanders’ were frequently taunted by locals who gibed ‘that they ought to be in uniform.’\textsuperscript{92} In some instances these kinds of gibes descended, after a few drinks, into fights between the Newfoundlanders and locals and these cases then ended up in ‘…unpleasant Police Court proceedings.’\textsuperscript{93} Relations were so sour that one forester’s wife wrote an article in the "Sunday

\textsuperscript{87} TNA: AVIA 22/1352, (unnumbered), Letter from P. E. Evans to C. U. Peat, 14 October 1942.
\textsuperscript{88} Sherwood, Many Struggles, pp. 3-23.
\textsuperscript{89} Kushner, Kushner, T., “‘Without intending any of the most undesirable features of a colour bar’: race, science, Europeaness and the British armed forces during the twentieth century’, Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 46, No. 3-4 (2012), pp. 339-374.
\textsuperscript{90} TNA: CO 876/43, (unnumbered), Copy of a BHFU Contract, (undated).
\textsuperscript{91} TNA: AVIA 22/1352, (unnumbered), Letter from P. E. Evans to C. U. Peat, 14 October 1942.
\textsuperscript{92} TNA: AVIA 22/1352, (unnumbered), Letter from A. E. Hart to Sir Harold Carrington, 22 September 1942.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
Post in which she asked locals in Scotland to show the Newfoundlanders greater kindness and to appreciate the important work which the men were doing. She wrote that the Newfoundlanders were ‘…being rather scurvily treated…’ by the locals and highlights an incident in which the Newfoundlanders were turned away from a local cinema without any due cause.  

Admittedly very little information is available on this aspect of the Newfoundlanders’ time in Scotland, but what information is available suggests that the NOFU were not particularly well received by the local population.

The British Hondurans’ Reception

In stark contrast with the Newfoundlanders’ reception, the records suggest that the British Hondurans were well received by the local population on the whole with one letter stating that the men have been given ‘… a considerable amount of social hospitality…’ and are ‘… very much liked by the local people.’ The official records are peppered with examples of the men interacting with locals including participating in local sports days, going to dances together and locals hiring the Duns Camp Jazz band to play at events. However, not all of the locals in the vicinities of the camps were enamoured by the foresters and a few complaints were recorded. Nonetheless, these incidents appear to have been relatively few and far between, as Keith stated ‘… the men have established happy relations with the locals … There have been one or two unpleasant incidents, but nothing that need cause us

concern.’ Sherwood suggests that the BHFU men were not particularly well received by the local population. Yet, the testimonies of two of the foresters, and the official records, suggest otherwise. According to Ford, for example, ‘Most of the Scottish communities within the vicinity of the foresters’ camps… were very good with the men.’ He illustrates this claim with examples such as locals washing the foresters’ clothing free of charge and foresters’ even staying in the homes of the locals on the weekends. Although, Ford did concede that ‘… friction did arise’ when it came to relations with local women, and that locals who fraternised ‘too’ closely with the men were labelled with epithets such as ‘Nigger Lovers’. Another forester who remained in Scotland Sam Martinez reminisces on his time working as a forester enthusiastically, and fondly remembers the dances and parties with the locals, stating ‘We had a great time and the people were very nice to us…’ Generally it appears that while the British Hondurans’ time in Scotland was not free from discrimination, they were generally well liked and well received by the Scots living in the vicinities of the work camps.

Conclusions

The sources illustrate that the reception that the BHFU and the NOFU received were contradictory to what many would naturally assume would have been the case in 1940s Britain. On the whole it appears that the British Hondurans’ were received warmly in Scotland because of the colour of their skin. By contrast, the Newfoundlander were often

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100 Ford, Telling the Truth, p. 72.
101 Ibid, pp. 72-75.
102 THE LAST LUMBERJACK Sam Martinez left his homeland of British Honduras in 1941, bound for a new life as a woodcutter in Scotland. Now 96, he shares his wisdom with Vicky Allan and talks about changed times, staying positive and life as a local celebrity [originally published 15/01/2006]
held in contempt by the locals, precisely because their whiteness led many to presume that
they were ‘dodging service’. Nonetheless, it must be conceded that the official government
records concerning the NOFU may not have commented heavily on the Newfoundlanders’
reception due to the fact that they presumably would have been able to blend in more easily
with the locals, in comparison with the British Hondurans.

**Disbandment of the Units**

The circumstances surrounding the disbandment of the NOFU and the BHFU share virtually
no similarities. The NOFU was disbanded in July 1946, over a year after WWII had ended
in Europe.\(^{103}\) By contrast, the BHFU was disbanded in September 1943, almost two years
before the end of the war.\(^{104}\)

**The Disbandment of the Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit**

Very little has been written about the NOFU and accordingly the information regarding the
disbandment of the unit is limited. The NOFU was officially disbanded in July 1946,
although the men had been released from their contracts in May 1945 shortly after VE Day.
The reason why the men remained in Scotland for a further year after they had been released
from their contracts was to continue to fell wood until Britain’s timber imports reached pre-
1939 levels.\(^{105}\) After their disbandment the majority of the men who had served with the
NOFU returned to Newfoundland, although a few remained in Britain.\(^{106}\) Not all of the men
who returned to Newfoundland readjusted to regular life easily and for a long time they were
denied veterans’ benefits which the Canadian Forestry Corps, a military unit, received. This
was because the NOFU was a civilian unit and thus they were denied benefits such as

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\(^{103}\) Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit - [http://www.heritage.nf.ca/law/forestry_unit.html](http://www.heritage.nf.ca/law/forestry_unit.html) (accessed 01/04/15).


\(^{105}\) Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit - [http://www.heritage.nf.ca/law/forestry_unit.html](http://www.heritage.nf.ca/law/forestry_unit.html) (accessed 01/04/15).

\(^{106}\) Ibid.
rehabilitation services, pensions, and sick benefits. Clearly, NOFU came to a natural end after the war, as they had completed their job and their services were no longer needed in Britain. However, the situation with the BHFU was immeasurably different.

The Disbandment of the British Honduran Forestry Unit

The BHFU was disbanded in September 1943 and the reasons posited for this action were numerous. First, the MoS claimed that the BHFU were to be disbanded due to ill health, namely venereal disease. Second, it was argued that the unit were badly behaved. Third, it was claimed that the shipping position had improved making timber imports easier to attain, rendering the BHFU an uneconomical unit to maintain. And the fourth, but unofficial reason was concerns regarding the men’s relations with white women.

The first reason which the MoS employed to justify the disbandment and repatriation of the BHFU was the allegedly high incidence of venereal disease amongst the men. Nevertheless, as Keith pointed out in a letter to the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies ‘… V.D. is a curable disease and… The actual number of cases of V.D. involved does not appear to be more than 80/90… out of about a 1000 men.’ The second claim that the unit should be disbanded due to the mens’ bad behaviour was also a poor argument for their repatriation. To cite Keith again, ‘There is no real evidence that the men are any worse behaved than the Newfoundlanders and the other ‘foreigners’ in Scotland, but they are

108 TNA: CO 876/42, Record No. 90, Letter from MoS to Sir J. Hunter, Governor of British Honduras, 9 September 1943.
109 TNA: CO 876/42, Record No. 87, Letter from J. L. Keith to Sir G. Gater, 25 August 1943.
110 TNA: CO 876/42, (unnumbered), Note regarding Relations With White Women and Venereal Disease, 17 August 1943.
111 TNA: CO 876/42, (unnumbered), Letter from I. G. Cummings to J. L. Keith, 3 September 1943.
112 TNA: AVIA 22/1239, Record No. E26, Letter to C. U. Peat from unknown, 3 February 1943.
113 TNA: CO 876/42, Record No. 88, Notes For Use At the Meeting on September 8th With Members of the Ministry of Supply Regarding the Proposal to Repatriate the British Honduras Unit, September 1943.
114 TNA: CO 876/42, Record No. 87, Letter from J. L. Keith to Sir G. Gater, 25 August 1943.
coloured men, and therefore their immoralities get more publicity and are more shocking…"  

115 After facing a great deal of hostility from the CO the MoS then tried to present more diplomatic reasons to disband the unit. Next the MoS argued that the Canadian shipping position had improved and thus the forestry operations carried out by the BHFU were no longer necessary.  

116 To defend this stance the MoS pointed to the fact that the Australian and New Zealand units had already left Britain.  

117 However, the MoS failed to mention that these units had been transferred to Algeria, Western Europe and the Mediterranean.  

118 Additionally, if this argument was truly the case then the NOFU would have been disbanded also. The last argument presented by the MoS was that the BHFU were an uneconomical unit and that their productivity was too low to justify maintaining the unit.  

119 This was despite the fact that a conference held in November 1942 had concluded that the BHFU ‘…were doing good work, and… their output was better and lower in cost than that of home labour.’  

120 This is evident in the fact that while the BHFU in 1943 comprised 1.3% of the foresters working in Britain they were responsible for 2.5% of timber production.  

121 Further devaluing this argument is a report which noted that the NOFU are ‘… expensive producers…’  

122 Again it is apparent that the MoS wanted to rid themselves of the British Honduran men and were prepared to employ any argument to do it. To quote a MoS official ‘… the disposal of the men in the forestry unit is very urgent…’

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115 TNA CO 876/42, (unnumbered), Letter from J. L. Keith to Sir C. Jeffries, 14 April 1943.  
116 TNA: CO 876/42, (unnumbered), Letter from I. G. Cummings to J. L. Keith, 3 September 1943.  
117 TNA: CO 876/42, Record No. 888, Note of discussion at Shell Mex House on the future of the British Honduras Unit, 8 September 1943.  
118 Sherwood, The British Honduran, p. 50.  
119 TNA: CO 876/43, Record No. 2, The British Honduras Unit, 17 December 1942; TNA:CO 123/384/7, Record No. 3, Letter from R. A. Whitehorn to Mr Robertson, 25 November 1943.  
120 TNA: CO 876/43, Record No. 10, British Honduras Unit – Notes on Conference, November 1942.  
121 TNA: AVIA 22/1239, Record No. E23, British Honduras Unit, 30 January 1943; Sherwood, Many Struggles, p. 95.  
122 TNA: CO 876/42, Record No. 36A, British Honduras Timber Unit, 13 April 1943.  
123 TNA: CO 123/384/7, Record No. 3, Letter from R. A. Whitehorn to Mr Robertson, 25 November 1943.
Ford concludes that racism on the part of the MoS was central to the BHFU’s disbandment. And Sherwood reaches a similar conclusion, but argues that the official reasons posited for the disbandment of the unit do not tell the whole story. For Sherwood government fears surrounding miscegenation and venereal disease were fundamental to the disbandment of the unit. These fears are a constant feature of the BHFU reports and are discussed at length by many high-profile individuals. One report noted that in regard to sexual relationships between foresters and local women, the MoS ‘… could regard itself free from any responsibility in such cases where Europeans only were concerned, it could not do so when coloured persons were involved…’ Miscegenation was a constant source of worry for the MoS and played a role in the disbandment of the unit, as the next chapter shall demonstrate.

The CO criticised the MoS harshly for what it perceived as the unjustified disbandment of the BHFU. One CO official stated that the disbandment of the unit ‘… is nothing but the easy way out, for the ministry…’ And another remarked that ‘… the M/Supply really want to send the men back because they have mismanaged the whole show and want to cover up before it’s too late.’ The CO fought fervently to prevent the disbandment of the unit, particularly due to the fact that there were few job opportunities for the men in their native British Honduras. However, their concerns regarding the political repercussions of the disbandment of the unit in the West Indies and its consequences for the Empire were also

124 Ford, Telling the Truth, pp. 76-80.
125 Sherwood, ‘It is not’, pp. 116-141; Sherwood, Many Struggles, pp. 118-120.
126 TNA: CO 876/43, Record No. 10, British Honduras Unit – Notes on Conference, November 1942.
127 TNA: CO 876/43, (unnumbered), Unsigned and Unaddressed Letter, 27 August 1943.
128 TNA: CO 876/42, Record No. 86, Unaddressed and Unsigned Letter, 24 August 1943.
key. Nevertheless, despite the CO’s continuous efforts the MoS was successful in disbanding the unit, nearly three years before the NOFU was disbanded.

**Conclusions**

In summary it is apparent that in regard to the disbandment of the units race played a crucial role. The NOFU, an almost entirely white unit, was allowed to run its natural course. Meanwhile, the BHFU, an almost entirely black unit, was abruptly disbanded. Both units were productive and it was widely noted that the Newfoundlanders were much worse behaved than the British Hondurans. Furthermore, although it is not commented on, it can be assumed that some of the 3400 Newfoundlanders who served in Britain would have had sexual relationships with local women, and some will have had venereal diseases. Yet, because they were white this was a non-issue. Clearly, societal concerns surrounding miscegenation and venereal disease during WWII Britain played a significant part in the disbandment of the BHFU. This is evident due to the preoccupation of government officials, charged with overseeing the BHFU, with miscegenation and venereal disease. Furthermore, the reasons posited by the MoS for the repatriation of the BHFU (uneconomical workers, improved timber supply, prevalence of venereal disease) were all proved to be either unfounded or, in the case of venereal disease, rectifiable. Therefore, it can be concluded that the MoS used these excuses as a guise for their true reasons to

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130 TNA: CO 876/42, (unnumbered), Letter to Sir G. Gater from Unknown, 4 September 1943; TNA: CO 876/42, Record No. 88, Notes For Use At the Meeting on September 8th With Members of the Ministry of Supply Regarding the Proposal to Repatriate the British Honduras Unit, September 1943.

131 TNA: CO 876/42, Record No. 90, Letter from MoS to Sir J. Hunter, Governor of British Honduras, 9 September 1943; Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit - [http://www.heritage.nf.ca/law/forestry_unit.html](http://www.heritage.nf.ca/law/forestry_unit.html) (accessed 01/04/15).

132 TNA: CO 876/42, Record No. 88, Notes For Use At the Meeting on September 8th With Members of the Ministry of Supply Regarding the Proposal to Repatriate the British Honduras Unit, September 1943; TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 119, Letter from J. L. Keith to Mr Wyndham, 25 August 1942.

133 TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 149, Letter from Harold Macmillan to the Duke of Buccleuch, 2 October 1942.
repatriate the BHFU; to mask their poor handling of the unit and fears surrounding miscegenation. Ultimately, if the BHFU were not disbanded due to race centred issues the NOFU would have also been disbanded in 1943.

**Final Conclusions**

In summary, race did play a role in certain aspects of the BHFU’s and the NOFU’s treatment and experiences in Scotland. In their terms of employment it can be argued that on the grounds of race the BHFU were given discriminatory terms, principally in terms of their ‘actual’ wages received. This equated to fifty-two shillings less per month than the Newfoundlanders’ received for the same work.\(^\text{134}\) In regard to the camps which the foresters lived in, it appears that both units were inadequately looked after by the MoS irrespective of race. Earlier studies argued that the awful conditions in the BHFU camps existed due to the MoS’s apathy towards the foresters’ as black men.\(^\text{135}\) However, looking at the issue comparatively has demonstrated that the indifference shown by the MoS towards the BHFU was also shown towards the terrible conditions in the NOFU camps too.\(^\text{136}\) In respect of the NOFU and the BHFU’s reception by the local Scottish populations it is clear that race played a role, but in a contrary way to what one might have assumed. On the whole the BHFU were well received because of their race, they were seen as a novelty by many of the locals who lived in the vicinity of the camps and were not deemed to be avoiding military service.\(^\text{137}\) On the other hand, it appears that the Newfoundlanders were received badly because of their skin colour. In the eyes of many locals they should have been fighting in Europe, not felling


\(^{136}\) TNA: CO 876/42, Record No, 87, Letter from Unknown to J. L. Keith, 25 August 1943.

trees in Scottish forests.\textsuperscript{138} Where it can be certainly argued that race did play a central role in the disbandment of the units. The NOFU was allowed to run its natural course.\textsuperscript{139} Meanwhile, the BHFU’s time working in Scotland was brusquely cut short and insufficient excuses were provided by the MoS to justify this. A reading of the official reports clearly demonstrates that race, and concerns surrounding miscegenation and venereal disease played a part in the disbandment of the unit.\textsuperscript{140} In conclusion race did ultimately play a defining role in certain aspects of the NOFU’s and BHFU’s experiences in Scotland. Interestingly, however, race did not always play a role in the ways in which one might assume it would have.

\textsuperscript{138} TNA: AVIA 22/1352, (unnumbered), Letter from A. E. Hart to Sir Harold Carrington, 22 September 1942.
\textsuperscript{139} Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit - \url{http://www.heritage.nf.ca/law/forestry_unit.html} (accessed 01/04/15).
Chapter 2 – Contextualising the Examples of Institutional Racism in the British Honduran Forestry Units’ Reports

The purpose of this second chapter is to contextualise the racial prejudice, which appears continuously throughout the BHFU’s official records, in respect to the prevailing attitudes regarding race in 1940s Britain. These racist attitudes in the reports are primarily expressed by the MoS which employed the BHFU and was responsible for its welfare. One example of this racism is the paternalistic language used throughout reports in which the British Honduran men were repeatedly referred to as ‘children’. Another example of these attitudes are government officials’ obsessive concern regarding relationships between white women and the British Honduran men. Therefore this chapter seeks to address and contextualise these attitudes expressed towards the BHFU. To achieve this, this chapter shall first discuss the societal attitudes towards non-whites during this period. And secondly, it will consider the consensus opinion in regard to miscegenation during this time, an issue which could be described as a ‘moral panic’ of the time.

Prior to the outbreak of WWII the majority of Britons had never met nor seen a black person. At this time the black population (a catchall term which included Africans, West Indians,
Indians and Arabs) stood at around fifteen-thousand and these individuals were primarily centred around the seaports of Liverpool, South Shields, Cardiff and London. However, with the advent of WWII there was an influx of non-whites arriving in Britain to help with the war effort. These individuals ranged from colonials from the British Empire coming to work in English munitions factories, Scottish forests, the R.A.F and Colonial regiments to black American GIs who arrived en masse with the American Army. On the whole historians tend to write that these individuals were relatively well received by the British populace. However, underneath the veneer of this friendly welcome were some warped, paternalistic attitudes, especially in regard to colonials. Britain had for a long time ruled its colonies in an exceedingly paternalistic manner and this paternalistic attitude was held about the colonials who they ruled over also. In British culture colonials were widely depicted as childlike individuals who needed guidance from the motherland, Britain. This took the form of the British colonising numerous nations around the world, with the thinly veiled justification of ‘civilizing’ and ‘uplifting’ those indigenous ‘childlike heathens’. These notions are apparent in Rudyard Kipling’s poem The White Man’s Burden in which he refers to colonial Indians as ‘Half devil and half child’. This paternalistic sentiment which was to some extent ingrained in the British psyche, especially amongst the upper echelons in society, is apparent throughout the official records concerning the BHFU. On numerous occasions the men are referred to as ‘grown up

147 Ibid, p. 328; Schaffer, ‘Fighting Racism’, p. 251; D. Reynolds, Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942-45 (New York, Random House), pp. 302-24; Fryer, Staying Power, p. 359. However, according to Schaffer this positive reception of blacks in Britain must be partially attributed to Britons disinclination to be dictated to by Americans.
children’, ‘very childish’, or as having ‘much of the child in their disposition.’ This language, used regularly by government officials, was used to discredit and dismiss the British Honduran foresters’ legitimate grievances. In an unsigned letter from the MoS, for example, a government official states that such complaints were probably due to the fact that ‘Colonial people such as the Honduras Foresters like to talk and to complain…’ Moreover, in a report on the Unit written by Sir Harold Carrington, who was ultimately in charge of the unit, some of the men are described as ‘agitators’ and ‘grumblers’. Clearly, considering the welfare conditions described in the previous chapter, it is evident that the MoS were attempting to dismiss the grievances of the men by invoking the idea that they are ‘irrational children’ who should be ignored. Interestingly, Sherwood, who strongly focuses on the racial aspect of the topic fails to highlight any of this paternalistic language present in the official records. During WWII Britain projected an image of being a liberal and tolerant nation which was fighting against the heinous ideology of Nazism. Yet, just beneath the surface intolerant and illiberal attitudes were common place in Britain. As Gavin Schaffer stated, ‘It is perhaps the subtlety of British prejudice that has led to analyses that Britain was a tolerant host during the Second World War.’ The way in which the MoS and other government officials regarded the British Hondurans illustrates these prejudiced and paternalistic attitudes which were ‘hiding’ just beneath the surface in British society.

151 TNA: AVIA 22/1239, Record No. E26, Letter to C. U. Peat from unknown, 3 February 1943; TNA: AVIA 22/1239, (unnumbered), Notes for Ministers – Visits to the British Honduras Units by C. U. Peat, 27 February 1943; TNA: CO 876/42, Record Number 18A, Unsigned Letter to Secretary of State, 20 February 1943.
153 TNA: CO 876/43, Record No. 50, British Honduras Unit. Quarterly Report – Period ending 24/3/43, 30 April 1943.
154 Sherwood, ‘It is not’; Sherwood, Many Struggles; Sherwood, The British Honduran.
155 Wynn, ‘Race War’ pp. 324-325; p. 335.
These prejudiced attitudes are somewhat of a redolent of the racist attitudes which were prominent amongst those with influence in Britain during the preceding centuries. As the historian Peter Fryer writes ‘…racism was not confined to a handful of cranks. Virtually every scientist and intellectual in nineteenth-century Britain took it for granted that only people with white skin were capable of thinking and governing.’ \(^{158}\) Enlightenment thinking played a defining role in shaping Western European attitudes towards race throughout the proceeding centuries, and to many enlightenment thinkers’ men were intrinsically rational and virtuous beings. \(^{159}\) However, rationality and virtue were solely applied to men, specifically white western European men. Non Western European men and women of all races and ethnicities were excluded. These individuals were capricious individuals ruled by their base emotions and desires. \(^{160}\) As Sonya O. Rose succinctly states ‘… European men have been associated with reason while women and racialized men have been associated with body and desire.’ \(^{161}\)

These beliefs regarding the inherent traits of white men in comparison to those inherent in women and men of colour help to inform our understanding of the fears regarding interracial relationships, principally those between white women and men of colour. These ideas have been important due to the fact that throughout the past few centuries female sexual behaviour and morality has been heavily intertwined with the political and social order of the nation. \(^{162}\)

This is particularly apparent during the Victorian period where women, the ‘upholders of morality in society’, were deemed to be both ‘passionless’ and yet inherently licentious. \(^{163}\)


\(^{161}\) Ibid, pp. 1173-74.

\(^{162}\) Ibid, p. 1174.

During WWII these ideas manifested themselves in a ‘moral panic’ regarding the moral laxity of some women. Thus in wartime Britain, where individuals were expected to put the interests of the nation above their own needs and wants, ‘sexually expressive’ women were deemed a threat.\textsuperscript{164} When these factors discussed above are intertwined with the notions held about black men, it is easy to understand the root of the panic surrounding interracial relationships. Schaffer illustrates this writing,

Prevalent beliefs in black mental inferiority and sexual prowess ensured that fears about new black communities in Britain tended to be based on British hostility towards inter-‘racial’ sex… Views of this nature were not uncommon among parliamentarians, government members and officials, and… While officially the British government did not adopt stance on the issue of mixed ‘race’ relationships, a clear hostility existed towards them.\textsuperscript{165}

Evidently, the fears regarding interracial relationships in WWII Britain were rooted in well-established beliefs, which were held by many in British society regarding both women and non-white men.

A ‘moral panic’ existed around interracial relationships in WWII Britain, and to explain why certain white women would consort with black men the press labelled these women as “‘loose’, ‘of a low type’, or ‘of a certain class’, that is prostitutes or akin to such.”\textsuperscript{166} To demonize miscegenation the British media, and British society, chose to denounce the women who engaged in them.\textsuperscript{167} And this is evident throughout the official records concerning the BHFU. In a letter written by Harold Macmillan, then Under Secretary of

\textsuperscript{164} Rose, ‘Sex, Citizenship’, p. 1175.
\textsuperscript{165} Schaffer, ‘Re-Thinking the’, p. 407.
\textsuperscript{166} Bland, ‘White Women’, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{167} For examples of this demonization of women in the British press see Bland, ‘White Women’; Rose, ‘Sex, Citizenship’.
State for the Colonies, to the Duke of Buccleuch, which addressed Buccleuch’s concerns regarding miscegenation, Macmillan wrote that the government had ‘… to protect women from our coloured units… All we can do is to mitigate the evil as far as possible.’\textsuperscript{168} And in his letters, Buccleuch describes certain local women as ‘unsophisticated’ and ‘simple country girls’.\textsuperscript{169} While Sir Harold Carrington similarly referred to the women who interacted with the foresters as those of the ‘amateur class’ and ‘immoral women’.\textsuperscript{170} However, these concerns were not inconsequential, as the previous chapter touched on, sexual relationships between the British Hondurans and white women were central to the disbandment of the unit.\textsuperscript{171}

For the MoS interracial relationships between the British Honduran men and white women, which they repeatedly described as ‘immoral relations’, were a constant source of concern which they believed could lead to public outcry.\textsuperscript{172} One government official conceded the government’s concerns stating ‘From a political point of view the most dangerous aspect of this matter is the association of the men with white women… There is constant danger of a serious public scandal at any moment.’\textsuperscript{173} Throughout the official records there are numerous comments in a similar vein coming from influential individuals.\textsuperscript{174} Judging by the hysteria within the records it would seem as though these relationships were common place. However, as of July 1943 only four marriages had occurred, which is very few considering

\textsuperscript{168}TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 148, Letter from the Duke of Buccleuch to Harold Macmillan, 30 September 1942.
\textsuperscript{169}TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 120, Letter from the Duke of Buccleuch to Harold Macmillan, 10 August 1942; TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 148, Letter from the Duke of Buccleuch to Harold Macmillan, 30 September 1942.
\textsuperscript{170} TNA: CO 876/42, Record No. 81, Letter from Sir H. Carrington to the Secretary of the MoS, 6 July 1943.
\textsuperscript{171} Sherwood, ‘It is not’, pp. 116-141; Sherwood, Many Struggles, pp.118-120.,
\textsuperscript{172} TNA: CO 876/43, Record No. 10, British Honduras Unit – Notes on Conference, November 1942; TNA: AVIA 22/1239, Record No. E26, Letter to C. U. Peat from unknown, 3 February 1943.
\textsuperscript{173} TNA: AVIA 22/1239, Record No. E26, Letter to C. U. Peat from unknown, 3 February 1943.
\textsuperscript{174}TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 149, Letter from Harold Macmillan to the Duke of Buccleuch, 2 October 1942; TNA: CO 876/42, Record No. 81, Letter from Sir H. Carrington to the Secretary of the MoS, 6 July 1943.
close to 1000 British Honduran foresters were working in the country. Further illustrating this hysteria was a police raid on the Duns camp in which over 200 police officers took part, which was conducted at the request of the MoS to remove a few prostitutes from the camp. Considering that there were an estimated 170 men in each camp, to describe the raid as an overreaction would be an understatement. Although one CO official saw this hysteria for what it was remarking, ‘… that there was much talk and more rumour…’ surrounding interracial relationships between the foresters and white women. It is apparent that the BHFU were not immune from the ‘moral panic’ surrounding interracial relationships during the 1940s and it would seem that one of the primary reasons why the MoS disbanded the BHFU was to avoid criticism for allowing real or potential interracial relationships to take place. The MoS’s fanatical concern regarding miscegenation is unashamedly racist. However, these concerns must be considered in context, and considering the climate it was operating in its concerns are understandable. These concerns were not concerns held solely by the MoS, but were concerns which were shared by many in British society. Therefore the MoS’s concerns and its decision to disband the unit were partly an attempt to shield itself from widespread criticism.

In conclusion the racial prejudice existent in the BHFU’s official records was not unique to the MoS, it was prejudice which was in-grained throughout British society. The MoS, although racist and inept, was ultimately a product of its time and thus its attitudes and actions must be understood in this context. Ideas regarding non-whites were entrenched in

175 TNA: CO 876/42, Record No. 81, Letter from Sir H. Carrington to the Secretary of the MoS, 6 July 1943.
176 TNA: AVIA 22/1239, Record No. 21, Police Action at Duns Camp, Letter from Sir H. Carrington to W. H. Ekins, 25 January 1943; TNA: AVIA 22/1239, Record No. 19, Telegram from Duns Camp to J. N. Young of British Honduras, 7 January 1943.
178 TNA: CO 876/43, Record No. 2, The British Honduras Unit, 17 December 1942.
179 TNA: CO 876/42, (unnumbered), Note regarding Relations With White Women and Venereal Disease, 17 August 1943.
the British psyche, and these individuals were often seen as childlike, irrational and licentious and this is particularly apparent in the official records concerning the BHFU.¹⁸⁰

To a reader in the twenty-first century these notions, and some of what is written in the official records, is objectionable. Nevertheless, it is for the most part in keeping with the broader attitudes and concerns of 1940s Britain in regard to race and thus when considering the racial prejudice in the BHFU official records this must be acknowledged.

Conclusion

The motivation for writing this dissertation was to contribute a piece of research to two relatively neglected areas of British history. Namely, the experiences of ethnic minorities in Scotland, and the contributions made by those from throughout the Empire during WWII. Through the utilisation of numerous primary and secondary sources this dissertation has endeavoured to build upon what has already been written about the NOFU and the BHFU to enhance our understanding of their experiences.

The first chapter of this dissertation compared and contrasted many different aspects of the BHFU’s and the NOFU’s time in Scotland and concluded that race did play a role in the experiences of both units. In respect of pay, contract length and disbandment the BHFU were treated in a discriminatory fashion, and it has been argued that this was on the grounds of their race. Additionally, this dissertation has contested the conclusions drawn by both Ford and Sherwood that the poor conditions in the work camps were meted out to the BHFU because of their skin colour. This is because this dissertation has found that the NOFU also experienced similarly poor conditions in their work camps, which suggests that the MoS was lethargic in its administration of welfare in the camps regardless of the race of the camps inhabitants. Furthermore, this dissertation has concluded that the BHFU were warmly received by the local population because of the colour of their skin. Meanwhile, the NOFU were poorly received due to the colour of the skin, which led many locals to suspect them of avoiding military service. In summary this chapter concluded that race did play a role

182 TNA: CO 876/42, Record No. 86, Unaddressed and Unsigned CO Letter, 24 August 1943; TNA: CO 876/42, Record No. 87, Letter from Unknown to J. L. Keith, 25 August 1943.
183 TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 60, Letter from J. L. Keith to Mr Parkin, 29 April 1942; TNA: CO 876/41, Record No. 149, Letter from the Duke of Buccleuch to Harold Macmillan, 30 September 1942; TNA: CO 876/43, Record No. 63, Monthly Report of the Welfare Officer, Southern District for September 1943, October 1943
184 TNA: AVIA 22/1352, (unnumbered), Letter from P. E. Evans to C. U. Peat, 14 October 1942.
in the treatment of both units, however, not always in the way which previously had been, or naturally would be, assumed.

The objective of the second chapter of this dissertation was to assess certain racist attitudes within the official records concerning the BHFU to ascertain whether these attitudes were representative of those of British society in the 1940s or unique to the MoS. The paternalistic attitude of the MoS and its overbearing concern with miscegenation were the focus of this chapter. Which concluded that the MoS’s attitudes towards the men, were largely in keeping with the wider views of British society towards non-whites during the 1940s185. Therefore, arguing that the MoS’s attitudes were characteristic of its time and must be understood in that context.

In summary this dissertation has in theory achieved what it set out to achieve, specifically to assess whether or not race played a role in the experiences of the BHFU and the NOFU during their time working in Scotland. And to assess whether or not the racist attitudes within the BHFU official records were reflective of the attitudes of 1940s British society in regard to race. Although, admittedly not enough archival material survives or exists to draw definite conclusions, and if more sources were to become available different conclusions may be drawn. Furthermore, the foresters who served in both units have left very few testimonies of their experiences making it difficult to fully comprehend their experiences. Consequently what has been written about the BHFU has largely exhausted the sources currently available in the archives. Nevertheless, certain aspects of the history of the NOFU remain underexplored and thus there is still scope further research to be undertaken.

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